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Abstract. Assessment of software COTS components is an essential part of component-based software 
development. Poorly chosen components may lead to solutions of low quality and that are difficult to 
maintain. The assessment may be based on incomplete knowledge about the COTS component itself and other 
aspects (e.g. vendor’s credentials, etc), which may affect the decision of selecting COTS component(s). We 
argue in favor of assessment methods in which uncertainty is explicitly represented (‘uncertainty explicit’ 
methods) using probability distributions. We provide details of a Bayesian model, which can be used to 
capture the uncertainties in the simultaneous assessment of two attributes, thus, also capturing the 
dependencies that might exist between them. We also provide empirical data from the use of this method for 
the assessment of off-the-shelf database servers which illustrate the advantages of ‘uncertainty explicit’ 
methods over conventional methods of COTS component assessment which assume that at the end of the 
assessment the values of the attributes become known with certainty. 
Keywords: COTS component assessment, reliability and performance assessment, Bayesian inference 
1. Introduction 
The use of commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) components in software development is ubiquitous. There are 
many benefits to using COTS components stemming from the incentive to cut down on cost and development 
time and to improve quality by using tried and tested components. An essential part of component-based 
software development is the assessment of available COTS components. Various assessment methods have been 
proposed [1], [2], [3], [4], [5], [6], [7], [8], [9], [10], [11], [12], [13], [14]. The results of these assessment 
techniques crucially depend on assuming that the values of the assessed attributes will be known with certainty 
at the end of the assessment.  However, since the assessment is carried out with limited resources of time and 
budget the outcome is subject to uncertainty.  
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We propose an assessment method, in which the assessment results are subject to explicitly stated uncertainty 
and discuss how this may impact the selection of COTS software. The method also enables representing the 
dependencies that exist between the uncertainties associated with the values of the COTS component attributes, 
which affect the decision about which of the available COTS components to choose. It also encourages assessing 
the dependent attributes simultaneously, thus identifying the dependencies that may exist between the values of 
the attributes which may affect the choice of component(s). We provide empirical results from a study with off-
the-shelf database servers, which demonstrate how the assessment method can be used in practice. 
The paper is structured as follows: section 2 contains a brief review of related work on COTS component 
assessment and attribute definitions; section 3 contains an overview of the problems that need to be addressed 
during COTS component assessment; in section 4 we describe models of assessment, in which model parameters 
(values of the attributes to be assessed) are not known with certainty and argue in favor of using probability 
distributions as an adequate mechanism to capture this uncertainty; in section 5 we give details of an empirical 
study with off-the-shelf database servers and also some contrived numerical examples, which illustrate the 
advantages of handling uncertainty and dependence between the values of the attributes; section 6 contains a 
discussion of the scalability and applicability of the method proposed; and finally in section 7 we present 
conclusions and possible further work.  
2. Related Work 
2.1 COTS Assessment Methods 
There is a wide variety of COTS component assessment approaches available. All of them start with an initial 
statement of requirements, which defines what is being sought. It has been proposed that the requirements 
initially should not be too stringent, since this would discard potentially appropriate COTS component 
candidates at a very early stage [9], [15]. It has even been suggested [15] that if the requirements are not flexible 
then the COTS-based development may not be appropriate and bespoke development could be more cost-
effective. So initially [15] suggests distinguishing between essential requirements and those that are negotiable. 
The selection criteria are then based on the essential requirements. 
Off-the-shelf-option (OTSO) [2] is a multi-phase approach to COTS component selection. The phases are: the 
search phase, the screening and evaluation phase and the analysis phase. In the first phase COTS components are 
identified. In the screening and evaluation phase the components are further filtered using a set of evaluation 
criteria (established from a number of sources, including the requirements specification, the high level design 
specification etc.). In the analysis phase results of the evaluation are analyzed, which lead to the final selection of 
COTS components for inclusion in the system. Other similar multiphase process approaches for COTS 
component evaluation that have been proposed include CEP (Comparative Evaluation Process Activities) [7], 
CBA Process Decision Framework [8] which in addition to defining a process for COTS component assessment 
also defines two other processes: COTS integration (“gluing”) and COTS configuration (“tailoring”); CAP-
COTS Acquisition Process method [5] and PECA Process [13].  
Procurement-oriented requirements engineering (PORE) [1] is a process in which requirements are defined in 
parallel with COTS component evaluation and selection. [1] propose using prototypes to develop knowledge 
Uncertainty Explicit Assessment of Off-The-Shelf Software: A Bayesian Approach      3 
concerning COTS components and their use within the wider system. Other methods that are centred on the 
requirements to assist with the COTS component selection process are CRE-COTS-Based Requirements 
Engineering Method [6], Storyboard Process [11], Combined Selection of COTS Components [12] and COTS-
DSS [14]. 
CISD (COTS-based Integrated System Development) [4] and CDSEM (Checklist Driven Software Evaluation 
Methodology) [3] are both checklist-based evaluation methodologies. STACE (Socio Technical Approach to 
COTS Evaluation) [10] is a socio-technical approach to evaluation which builds on work of [1] and [2] and 
emphasizes the organizational issues related to COTS selection. 
2.2 Attribute Definition Methods 
Extensive work has been also reported on definition of COTS component assessment attributes. A 
comprehensive list is given in [16]. They group the attributes in two categories depending on how they can be 
measured: Attributes Measurable at Runtime (which contain Accuracy, Security, Recoverability, Time Behavior 
and Resource Behavior) and Attributes Measurable during Component Life-Cycle (Suitability, Interoperability, 
Maturity, Learnability, Understandability, Operability, Changeability, Testability and Replaceability). These 
attributes are further divided into more fine-grained attributes, which are measurable using their proposed 
metrics of: presence, time, level and ratio. This work [16] follows the spirit of the guidelines for attribute 
definitions outlined by the international standardizing organizations ISO [17], and IEEE/ANSI [18] in a broader 
context, not specific to COTS component attributes. COCOTS framework by Abts et al. [19], and Torchiano and 
Jaccheri [20] also provides COTS attribute definitions. 
3. Problems with COTS Component Assessment 
3.1 Motivation 
Any assessment is conducted with limited resources and under various assumptions, which may not hold true in 
real operation. As a result the outcome of the assessment is subject to uncertainty – the assessor may never be 
100% sure that what they concluded during the assessment (both about the values of the attributes as well as the 
choice of a COTS component) will be confirmed when the COTS component is used in operation. This is clearly 
true for some parameters, which can be estimated objectively, e.g. failure rate, performance, etc. For failure rate, 
for instance, even after a very thorough testing one can only identify a range of rates which are more likely than 
others. For instance, Littlewood and Wright have shown [21] that starting with indifference between the values 
of the failure rate (i.e. uniform distribution of the failure rate in the range [0, 1]) and seeing a protection system 
process correctly 4603 demands translates into 99% confidence that this system’s probability of failure on 
demand (pfd) is no worse than 10-3. The same equally applies to attributes assessed subjectively, e.g. using the 
Likert scale [22], widely used in the COTS component assessment. It may be difficult for an assessor to justify 
that a COTS component must be ranked at exactly, say 7 out of 10, according to a chosen scale but he/she may 
be certain that the ‘true’ value of the attribute is in the range [6, 7].  
Uncertainty Explicit Assessment of Off-The-Shelf Software: A Bayesian Approach      4 
The value of expressing the assessment results in the form (value, confidence) has been recognized in some other 
technical areas which dealt with assessment. The best performing software reliability-growth models (RGM) 
which predict the failure rate from the observed failures in the past, for instance, are those in which the model 
parameters are treated as random variables [23]. In these models the ‘true’ values of the attributes being assessed 
are never assumed known with certainty. Instead the attribute is characterized by a probability distribution, from 
which the true value of the attributes will come (i.e. are seen as drawn at random). For each reliability target, 
then, the assessor can tell the probability that the true reliability is lower than the target. Such models 
systematically outperformed the alternative simplistic methods in which the parameters were assumed to be 
known with certainty [24]. If the ‘uncertainty explicit’ models have been best with one specific method of 
assessment – software reliability – it seems natural to try similar ‘uncertainty explicit’ methods for other 
assessments, e.g. evaluation of COTS software and selecting the best out of a set of comparable alternatives. 
This is the focus of this paper.  
There are various methods for representing uncertainty [25]. Bayesian approach to probabilistic modelling is one 
of the best-known ones and used with some success in reliability assessment [24], [21]. It allows one to combine, 
in a mathematically sound way, the prior belief (which may be ‘subjective’) about the values of a parameter or a 
set of parameters to be assessed with the (‘objective’) evidence from seeing the modelled artefact in operation. 
Combining the prior belief and the evidence from the observations in a mathematically correct way leads to a 
posterior belief about the values of the assessed attribute(s).  
How does ‘uncertainty explicit’ assessment differ from the conventional deterministic assessment? With 
deterministic assessment point estimates of the attributes are used. A common approach of comparing the 
alternatives is then to use a weighted sum of the estimates for each of the alternatives. When uncertainty is 
accounted for, this approach is still possible – we can use various characteristics of the posterior distributions 
(mean, median, etc.) of the attributes as estimates and then calculate the weighted sum for each of the COTS 
components included in the assessment before deciding which is the best one. When uncertainty is explicitly 
used in the assessment, however, more refined ways of comparison are possible: from the posterior one can 
express the uncertainty in the value of the comparison criterion, e.g. the weighted sum of the attributes. Since 
the value of the weighted sum is now uncertain we have a range of options. We may give preference to the 
COTS component for which the mean (median) value of the weighted sum is the best (as we would have done 
with point estimates of the attributes). With uncertainty stated explicitly a range of new options exists, which is 
illustrated in Fig. 1.  
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Fig. 1 - The pfd for two different COTS components 
In this figure we illustrate the value of handling uncertainty explicitly even when dealing with a single 
assessment attribute, COTS component reliability. Let us assume that Fig. 1 illustrates the cumulative 
distribution function (c.d.f.) graph for two COTS components with the same average pfd.  If we wanted to 
choose the COTS component that has the highest probability of having a pfd of no worse than 6*10-3 (i.e. the 
value of the x-axis of 0.006) then we would choose COTS component A, whereas the COTS component with the 
highest probability of having a pfd of no worse than 4.10
-3
 is COTS component B. We can also see clearly that 
the distribution of the pfd of COTS component B is much more spread than that of COTS component A (in fact 
the distribution of COTS component B is uniformly spread across all the values from 0 to 10
-2
). Therefore there 
is a much higher uncertainty associated with the values of COTS component B than that of COTS component A. 
Stating uncertainty explicitly offers the assessor a wider range of options in selecting the most appropriate COTS 
component. 
3.2 Dependence among Attributes 
COTS component assessment requires dealing with multiple attributes of the COTS components being 
compared. The selection of a particular COTS component, thus, is a multi-criteria decision which taken under 
uncertain values of the attributes naturally leads to the question about the dependence between the uncertainties 
associated with the individual attributes. Ignoring the possible dependence between the uncertainties in 
attributes’ values represents a particular form of belief: that assessing attribute X one can learn nothing about 
another attribute, Y. For example, performance of a COTS component will hardly tell anything about the quality 
of its documentation and vice versa. It is quite obvious, however, that not all COTS component attributes are like 
that. In many cases while assessing an attribute X the assessor may infer something about the values of another 
set of attributes. For instance, if we devise a prototype in order to assess the functionality of a COTS component 
we will also learn something about the performance (how quickly this COTS component responds to requests) 
and how reliable the COTS component is. A more subtle, but very useful concept, as we will see later, is that the 
uncertainties associated with the assessed attributes may be dependent. Informally, assume that we want to 
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assess the reliability and performance of a COTS component. We may assume that the uncertainties associated 
with these two attributes are independent, in the statistical sense. Under this assumption learning something 
about reliability will tell us nothing about performance and vice versa. Now suppose that we have run a very 
long testing campaign and have repeatedly observed that whenever the response was late it was also incorrect 
and no other incorrect response has been observed. With such evidence of a strong positive correlation between 
the failures (incorrect responses) and the responses being late, we may accept that any change of our belief about 
the rate of failure should also be translated into a change in our belief about the rate of late responses. The 
assessment models surveyed invariably assume that the values of the attributes are independent and do not allow 
for dependencies between their uncertain values to be captured adequately. 
In summary, with the assessment method that we propose in this paper we aim to handle both the uncertainties 
in the values of the attributes and the dependence that exists between the values of the different attributes. The 
existing assessment methods we surveyed do not deal explicitly with either of these two uncertainties.  
4. Assessment of COTS Components: a Bayesian Approach 
In this section we briefly summarize how the Bayesian approach to assessment is normally applied to assessment 
of a single attribute. Assume that the attribute of interest is the component’s probability of failure on demand 
(pfd). If the system is treated as a black box, i.e. we can only distinguish between COTS component’s failures or 
successes, the Bayesian assessment proceeds as follows. Let us denote the system pfd as p, with prior 
distribution (probability density function, pdf) )(•pf , which characterises the assessor’s knowledge about the 
COTS component pfd prior to observing the COTS component in operation. Assume further that the COTS 
component is subjected to n demands, independently drawn from a ‘realistic’ operational environment (profile)1, 
and r failures are observed. The posterior distribution, ),|( nrxf p , of p after the observations will be: 
)()|,(),|( xfxrnLnrxf pp ∝ ,        (1) 
where )|,( xrnL  is the likelihood of observing r failures in n demands if the pfd were exactly x, which in this 
case of independent demands is given by the binomial distribution,
rnr
xx
r
n
xrnL
−−





= )1()|,( . For any 
prior and any observation (r, n) the posterior can be calculated2 for all the COTS components included in the 
assessment. Even if no failure is observed (i.e. r = 0), the posterior can be calculated. Other measures of interest 
can also be derived from this posterior, e.g. the probability that the COTS component will survive the next 5000 
                                                           
1 An operational profile [26] can be defined as a statistically accurate characterization of how the component will be used in 
its ‘true’ environment. 
2 The posterior can be calculated either by using a conjugate prior distribution [27], in which case the posterior distribution is 
guaranteed to be in the same family as that of the prior for a given likelihood function (e.g. Beta distribution prior, with 
Binomial Likelihood function, gives us a Beta distributed posterior) or it can be calculated through numerical methods and 
approximations. In our case, since the conjugate family has limitations [28] we have used numerical methods to calculate 
the posterior.  
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randomly chosen demands. This probability can be calculated for each of the COTS components included in the 
assessment as follows:  
( ) ( )∫
∞
−
0
5000
,|1 dpnrpfp p . 
Then the best COTS component will be the one, for which the integral above gets a maximum value. 
4.1. A Model for Assessment of 2 Non-Independent Attributes 
Typically, COTS component assessment is a multi-criteria decision with dozens of attributes usually assessed 
and taken into account (as detailed in [2], [1], [5], [8]). The Bayesian assessment can be applied to multiple 
attributes, too. For simplicity we first demonstrate the approach with two attributes and then discuss (in section 
5) the implications of scaling it up to many attributes. A similar model to the one we describe here has been used 
in the past in assessing reliability of various systems built with components [28], [29]. 
Let us assume that two non-functional attributes must be assessed, such as the COTS component’s pfd and 
performance, the latter assessed in the form of whether the response is received on time or not, i.e. the 
probability of a late response on demand, pld. Using a binary score – on time vs. late – is an adequate approach 
when the COTS component is planned for integration in a larger system. In these circumstances using an 
absolute scale, e.g. how long it takes a COTS component to respond to a demand, may be unnecessary: it will be 
sufficient to know whether the response is received with an acceptable delay as dictated by the wider system. In 
terms of comparison of several COTS components using the binary scale (on time/late) seems also adequate. 
Any COTS component, which responds with an acceptable delay, is sufficiently good from the point of view of 
the system’s integrator.  
Here we define a model to help with the comparison of COTS components assessed by subjecting them to a 
series of independently selected demands. Both, the COTS component’s pfd and pld, are used in the comparison 
and different comparison criteria are discussed. 
On each demand the response received from the COTS components is evaluated from two different viewpoints: 
correct/incorrect and on time/late. Clearly 4 combinations exist, which can be observed on a randomly chosen 
demand, as shown in Table 1. 
Table 1 – The outcomes, their frequencies and probabilities for a random demand. 
 
Event 
Correct Response 
(Reliability) 
Response On-Time 
(Performance) 
Number of observations in 
n demands 
Probability 
α No Yes r1 10p  
β Yes No r 2 01p  
χ No No r 3 11p  
δ Yes Yes r 4 00p  
 
The four probabilities given in the last column sum to 1. So if the first three probabilities are 0.2, 0.4 and 0.3, 
respectively, then the last one 00p  = 1 - (0.2 + 0.4 + 0.3) = 0.1. This constraint remains even if we treat the 
probabilities in Table 1 as random variables: their sum will always be 1. Thus, the joint distribution of any three 
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of these parameters, e.g. ),,(
111001 ,,
•••pppf , gives an exhaustive description of the COTS component’s 
behaviour. In statistical terms, the model of the COTS component with two binary attributes has three degrees of 
freedom. 
The marginal probabilities of getting an incorrect response on a random demand, let’s denote it pI, and of getting 
the response late, pL, respectively, can be expressed as:  
1110 pppI +=  and 1101 pppL += . 
p11 represents the probability of receiving late an incorrect response. Hence, the notation pIL ≡ p11, 
1110 pppI +=  and 1101 pppL += will capture better the intuitive meaning of the event it is assigned to. 
Instead of using ),,(
110110 ,,
•••pppf  another distribution, which can be derived from it through a change of 
variables [30], can be used. In this section we use ),,(,, •••ILLI pppf  which can be factorised as: 
),|(),(),,( ,,, LIpppppp ppfff ILLIILLI •••=•••          (2) 
For the prior joint distribution ),(, ••LI ppf above, we assume throughout this paper that the pI and pL are 
independently distributed3. We capture the possible dependencies between the two failures processes 
(characterized by pI  and pL, respectively) by )(,| •LIIL pppf . Hence the full joint prior distribution is given by: 
),|()()(),,(,, LIpppppp ppffff ILLIILLI •••=•••          (3) 
For a given observation (r1, r2, and r3 in N demands) the posterior joint distribution can be calculated as: 
∫∫∫
=
ILLI
ILLI
ILLI
ILLI
ppp
ILLIppp
ILLIppp
ppp
dxdydzppprrrNLzyxf
ppprrrNLzyxf
rrrNzyxf
,,
321,,
321,,
321,,
),,|,,,(),,(
),,|,,,(),,(
),,,|,,(
    (4) 
where  
321321 )1()()(
)!(!!!
!
),,|,,,(
321321
321
rrrN
LIIL
r
IL
r
ILL
r
ILI
ILLI
pppppppp
rrrNrrr
N
ppprrrNL
−−−−−+−−
−−−
=
      (5) 
is the multinomial likelihood of the observation (r1, r2, r3 , N). 
4.2. Combination of Uncertainties in the Values of Attributes 
For comparison of the COTS components we will define the following criterion: 
Probability of an inadequate response, PSer, by the COTS component: of getting either an incorrect or late 
response. Clearly, PSer = PI + PL – PIL. Its posterior distribution, ),,,|( 321 rrrNf Serp • , can be derived from  
                                                           
3 The plausibility of making this independence assumption is explained in Appendix A. 
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the joint posterior, ),,,|,,( 321,, rrrNf ILLI ppp ••• , by first transforming it, to for example 
),,,|,,( 321,, rrrNf SerLI ppp ••• , and then integrating out the nuisance parameters PI and PL.  
An often used selection method [31] in the literature is the weighted sum of the values of the attributes. The 
weighted sum of the two attributes in our study can be calculated as follows: PS = kPI + (1-k)PL, in which the 
constant k is defined by the assessor in the range 0-1. High values of k correspond to cases when incorrect results 
are highly undesirable while late results may be tolerable. On the other hand, low values of k correspond to cases 
when incorrect results may be tolerated by the system while late responses may have serious consequences. In 
order to derive the marginal distribution of PS first the joint distribution ),,,|,,( 321,, rrrNf ILLI ppp ••• is 
transformed to ),,,|,,( 321,, rrrNf SLI ppp •••  and then the nuisance parameters PI and PL are integrated out, 
as above for PSer. However we will not be using this method of selection since the new variable PS does not have 
an obvious intuitive meaning. The difficulty is compounded in our case since the uncertainty is stated explicitly. 
It is impossible to say what a confidence of say 99% associated with a particular value of PS tells us about the 
COTS component being assessed. 
4.3. Partitioning the Demand Space 
In some areas of software engineering, especially in testing, the usefulness of partitioning the demand space has 
been recognised [32], [33], [26]. The demand space partitions typically represent different types of demands, 
which may have different likelihoods of occurring in a realistic environment. Realistic testing, thus, would 
require generating mixes of demands, which take into account the likelihood of the types of demands. 
In our context, operating in a partitioned demand space may imply that the uncertainty associated with the 
attributes of interest may differ among the partitions, e.g. as a result of different number of observations being 
made for the different partitions. 
If the demand space is partitioned into M partitions {S1, S2, … SM}, with a probabilistic measure { P(S1),…, 
P(SM)}
 4,  then for each of these the assessment will be performed as described above, e.g. with two attributes the 
description provided in section 4.1 will apply. As a result M conditional distributions will be associated with 
each COTS component, e.g. using reliability and performance these can be denoted as )|,,(,, ippp Sf ILLI ••• , 
from which the conditional distribution )|( ip Sf Ser •  will be expressed. This distribution characterises the 
probability of failure (incorrect or late response), iSer SP | , of the particular COTS component in the specific 
partition. Finally, in order to compare the competing COTS components the unconditional distribution 
)(•
Serp
f  should be derived for the particular profile defined over the set of partitions, which represents the 
targeted operational environment.  
                                                           
4 The meaning of these random variables is that a demand chosen at random with probability P(Si) will be drawn from Si.   
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Let us assume the profile of the targeted environment is known with certainty5. The marginal probability of 
failure of a COTS component, according to the formula of full probability is: 
( )∑
=
×=
M
i
iiSerSer SPSPP
1
|          (6) 
The distribution of this random variable, SerP , depends on the joint distribution, 
( )••,...,)|(),...,|( 1 MSerSer SPSPf , i.e. of the conditional probabilities of failure in sub-domains. In some setups it 
may be plausible to assume that the conditional probabilities of failure (in the partitions that is) are independently 
distributed, i.e.: 
( ) ( ) ( )∏
=
••=••
M
i
SPSPSPSP MSerSerMSerSer
fff
1
||)|(),...,|( ...,..., 11 .     (7) 
Such an assumption represents the assessor’s belief that learning something about the probability of failure, 
iSer SP | , of a particular COTS component in partition i will not change their belief about the probability of 
failure, jSer SP | , of the same COTS component in another partition. The assumption is consistent with 
applying inferences to the individual partitions, i.e. conditional on the demands coming from a particular 
partition.  
Under (7) the unconditional probability of COTS component failure (6) can be expressed as a convolution of the 
distributions of the random variables ( ) ( )iiSerw SPSPiP ×= | , i.e.: 
( )iPP wwSer ⊗=            (8) 
The selection of the best COTS component, out of the available alternatives, will then be based on the marginal 
distributions, )(•w
Serp
f , associated with the available COTS components. 
5. Numerical Examples: a Study with Off-The-Shelf Database Servers 
We have reported recently results of studies on dependability and performance of database servers [34], [35], 
[36], [37]. The focus of these earlier studies was in measuring the amount of “diversity”, in both correctness and 
response time, which exists between different servers, i.e. certain servers might give an incorrect and/or late 
response in one input but the others might not. The motivation behind this work was to get preliminary 
measurements on the improvements in reliability and performance that can be had from using more than one 
component in parallel in a multi-channel diverse configuration.  
In this paper we will use the data collected in those studies to demonstrate our approach to COTS component 
selection. SQL servers are a very complex category of off-the-shelf components, with many reported faults in 
                                                           
5 This assumption is needed for the comparison only. We do not require here that we know the ‘real’ operational 
environment, in which the system together with the chosen COTS component will be deployed. Taking into account the 
uncertainty about the profile is possible at the expense of making the calculations more complicated, which is beyond the 
scope of this paper. 
Uncertainty Explicit Assessment of Off-The-Shelf Software: A Bayesian Approach      11 
each release. In total six off-the shelf SQL servers from four different vendors were used. Four of the servers are 
open-source, namely PostgreSQL 7.0, PostgreSQL 7.2, Interbase 6.0 and Firebird 1.06. The other two servers are 
commercial closed development servers, anonymised here due to the restrictive ‘End User License Agreements’. 
We will refer to these components as CS1 (Commercial Server 1) and CS2 as they are from different vendors. 
An ideal selection of an SQL server based on the results of statistical testing of the COTS components may be 
problematic in practice. We will highlight two circumstances in which these difficulties can occur:   
- Assume that we are interested in choosing between several SQL servers, based on their reliability and 
performance. The ideal situation for choosing the most appropriate SQL server based on measurements after 
deploying the COTS components is clearly unrealistic since we would like to select the best server before the 
application is developed. 
- Assume that the system integrator (e.g. a software house) would like to make a strategic choice of a SQL 
server for use in the foreseeable future. In this scenario the application(s), which may be developed in the 
future may be even unknown at the time of making the selection.  
Given these difficulties we can use alternative options: 
- Use well-known benchmark applications. In the context of SQL servers this might be the TPC-C benchmark 
for on-line transaction processing [38]. In this case, the performance of the components can be measured 
directly on the target platform, but there might be problems observing failures. This is because it would be 
reasonable to expect that an SQL server would correctly process the statements defined in the TPC-C 
benchmark application. Thus, in this case the selection of the SQL server would be significantly influenced 
by the performance attribute. Even if failures are observed, such a measurement of the reliability of the 
COTS components may be very expensive; the likely candidates to choose from will be reliable components. 
Thus the amount of testing to observe a few failures may be prohibitively high [39]. We illustrate the 
assessment method with data collected from experiments with an implementation of the TPC-C client 
benchmark. For the TPC-C experiments we used all six aforementioned SQL servers. 
- Use stressful environments (in terms of the reliability attribute) for comparing the components, i.e. 
environments which increase the likelihood of failures occurring, even if we do not know how likely these 
are to occur in operation. The set of bugs of a particular COTS component (in our case SQL server) defines 
one such stressful environment for a server. The union of the bugs reported for all the compared COTS 
components will form a demand space, in which there will be a partition stressing each of the components. 
We have collected known bug reports for four of the SQL servers in our studies, namely PostgreSQL 7.0, 
Interbase 6.0, CS1 and CS2 and used them as a sample from a ‘stressful’ environment, in which to compare 
the COTS components. 
Detailed results for each of these studies are given in the next two sub-sections. We did not use partitioning of 
the demand space approach in the study with the TPC-C benchmark application (even though the TPC-C 
transactions types could form basis for such partitioning). This is because we did not have any reason to expect 
that the servers will perform differently (in terms of timeliness and correctness) for each transaction type. We 
however did use partitioning of the demand space in the study with the bug reports of the servers, since we had 
compelling reasons to expect that the servers will perform differently (this will be explained in section 5.2).  
                                                           
6 Firebird is the open-source descendant of Interbase. The later releases of Interbase are issued as closed-development by 
Borland. 
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5.1 Study with TPC-C Benchmark Application 
We first describe the results obtained using the TPC-C benchmark application as a basis of selecting the best 
SQL server. In the empirical study we used our own implementation of TPC-C. The benchmark defines five 
transaction types (New-Order, Payment, Order-Status, Delivery and Stock-Level) and sets the probability of 
execution for each, i.e. the particular transaction mix (profile) is defined. The specified performance measure is 
the number of New-Order transactions completed per minute. However, our measurements were more detailed - 
we recorded the transaction response times instead. The benchmark specifies an upper bound on the 90
th
 
percentile values for each transaction type. It requires that the average response time of each transaction type is 
less than or equal to the respective 90
th
 percentile value. The values are as follows: 
- New-Order - 5 seconds 
- Payment - 5 seconds 
- Delivery – 80 seconds 
- Order-Status – 5 seconds 
- Stock-Level – 20 seconds 
The test harness consisted of two machines:  
- A server machine, on which one of the six database servers was run. 
- A client machine, which executed a JAVA implementation of the TPC-C standard. 
Each experiment comprised the same sequence of 1000 transactions. We ran two types of experiments: 
- single client - a TPC-C compliant client modifies the database by executing the specified transaction mix. 
- multiple clients - a TPC-C compliant client modifies the database and additional 10 clients concurrently 
execute the read-only transactions (Order-Status and Stock-Level). 
Multiple clients experiment enabled us to increase the load on the servers and measure the effect of the increased 
load on their performance. 
A timeout value, specific to each transaction type, was used to distinguish between late and timely responses. 
We defined two sets of timeouts7:  
- The 90th percentile values specified by TPC-C (TPC-C timeout),  
- One fifth of the 90
th
 percentile values (short timeout). 
We defined four scenarios, varying the number of clients and timeout values respectively: 
- Scenario 1 - single client / TPC-C timeouts  
- Scenario 2 - single client / short timeouts  
- Scenario 3 - multiple clients / TPC-C timeouts  
- Scenario 4 - multiple clients / short timeouts  
The SQL servers were compared for each of the scenarios.   
                                                           
7 The choice of these was made after a personal communication of one of the authors with a TPC-C affiliate and auditor who 
confirmed that the values were conservative for a wide range of on-line transaction processing applications. 
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5.1.1 Prior Distributions 
The prior, ),,(,, •••ILLI pppf , was constructed under the assumption that PI and PL are independently 
distributed random variables, i.e. )()(),(, ••=•• LILI pppp fff . We made this assumption since we did not 
have any objective evidence to believe otherwise. In case there are reasons (objective or subjective) then the 
assumption of independence may be dropped. In this case the particular form of ),(, ••LI ppf should be defined 
explicitly. Additionally the conditional distributions ),|(,| LIPPp PPf LIIL • were defined for every pair of 
values of PI and PL, in the range [0, min(PI, PL)] since the probability of incorrect and late responses cannot be 
greater than the probability of either of the two individually. In passing we note that the choice of the prior is not 
critical with the benchmark application since an arbitrarily large number of demands can be generated, i.e. ‘the 
data will speak for itself’. 
We anticipated observing mainly late responses while the incorrect result failures were expected to be very rare. 
We have assumed ‘ignorance prior’ (Uniform distribution) for performance in the range ]1,0[∈LP . For 
incorrect result failures we have also assumed ignorance but using an upper bound of 10-2, likely to be very 
conservative in the context of TPC-C, i.e. we used the range ]10,0[ 2∈IP . We assumed ignorance priors for 
both PI and PL since we did not have any preference regarding their values. In this study we used the same 
distribution for all the servers since for the scenarios tested we did not have any reason to prefer one server over 
the others. There might, however, be cases – some discussed later in section 6.4 - whereby the assessor may have 
different prior beliefs about the competing COTS components.  
A summary of the distributions used and the range in which they are defined is given in Table 2. 
Table 2 - The Prior distributions (identical for all six servers and all four scenarios). 
Prior Distribution Range Distribution Type 
Reliability )(•
Ip
f  0 – 0.01 Uniform 
Performance )(•
Lp
f  0 – 1 Uniform 
Conditional distribution: ),|(,| LIppp PPf LIIL •  0 – min(PI,PL) Uniform 
5.1.2 Observations 
The observations from the TPC-C experiments are given in Table 3. The number of demands for all servers is 
1000. Five out of six servers exhibit late result failures only. Incorrect result failures are observed only for CS2. 
In addition, whenever a result was incorrect on CS2 it was late, too. The incorrect results observed were due to 
the specific concurrency control mechanism used by CS2 [34]. The locks on resources, e.g. database rows, were 
not released properly when the lock holding transactions were completed. To resolve the problem we had to 
install timeout watchdogs and abort transactions when the timeout expired. Each aborted transaction was 
repeated as many times as necessary to eventually commit successfully. We decided to use transaction repetition 
count as the criterion of an incorrect response on CS2. In particular, we defined a threshold of 5 as the value, 
beyond which the transaction would be considered to have failed. 
We used transaction timeout values and transaction repetition count to classify each demand on each server in 
the categories r1 to r4 (defined in section 4.1).  
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Table 3 - The observations of the six database servers for the four scenarios. The number of demands (n) is 1000 for each 
server. We did not observe any incorrect-only failures, i.e. r1=0 for all servers. 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 
COTS 
r1 r2 r3 r1 r2 r3 r1 r2 r3 r1 r2 r3 
PG 7.0 0 1 0 0 30 0 0 0 0 0 644 0 
PG 7.2 0 6 0 0 33 0 0 3 0 0 489 0 
IB 6.0 0 0 0 0 24 0 0 1 0 0 434 0 
FB 1.0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 439 0 
CS1 0 0 0 0 33 0 0 19 0 0 303 0 
CS2 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 1 0 329 1 
5.1.3 Posteriors 
The percentiles derived from the posterior distribution for the 4 scenarios are given in Table 48. One can see that 
the ordering between the servers changes as the number of clients and/or the timeout values vary (to improve the 
readability of the table we have explicitly shown the ranking order of the servers in each scenario). 
Under Scenario 1 (the least demanding scenario) four servers (IB 6.0, FB 1.0, CS1 and CS2) produce identical 
results since they completed without any failure (i.e. on time and correctly) the 1000 transactions. We are 
indifferent in the choice among them. The two versions of PostgreSQL exhibit late responses and they are 
ranked lowest.  
When we decrease the timeout value (Scenario 2) the ranking changes: now there are late responses with all the 
servers. The two worst servers are CS1 and again PostgreSQL 7.2. Interestingly, Firebird 1.0, an open-source 
server, is ranked the best.  
In Scenario 3 the percentile values are close again as in the first scenario, though the earlier version of 
PostgreSQL, PG 7.0, is ranked the best, alongside Firebird 1.0 while CS1 is the worst performing server. 
Firebird 1.0 is consistently among the best servers in the first 3 scenarios. An interesting observation is the 50
th
 
percentile value of the posteriors CS2 and IB 6.0. Even though the total number of failures for these two servers 
were the same (1 each, see Table 3), the nature of the failure was different: the result from CS2 was both 
incorrect and late whereas from IB 6.0 it was only late. Exploring this dependence we can still see a difference in 
the 50
th
 percentile values of these two servers (even though the difference is marginal and on the chosen 
accuracy of expressing the percentile values is not observed in the 99th percentile). We will further scrutinize the 
interplay between the failures of the individual components and the correlation between their failures with 
contrived examples in section 5.4.   
The ranking changes again in the most demanding scenario (Scenario 4). The best server is now CS1. 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
8 As we assumed the same priors for all the servers the differences of the posteriors will be solely due to the observations. 
Uncertainty Explicit Assessment of Off-The-Shelf Software: A Bayesian Approach      15 
Table 4 – Percentiles (abbreviated P-tile) for the distribution of the system quality PSer = PI + PL – PIL classified per scenario. 
To improve the readability we have also provided the ranking order for each of the servers based on the percentiles values. 
The prior distribution is the same for all servers across all scenarios. 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2  Scenario 3  Scenario 4  
P-tile COTS Prior 
Posterior Rank Posterior Rank Posterior Rank Posterior Rank 
PG 7.0 0.0021 5 0.0310 4 0.0012 1 0.6436 6 
PG 7.2 0.0071 6 0.0340 5 0.0041 5 0.4888 5 
IB 6.0 0.0012 1 0.0250 3 0.0021 4 0.4340 3 
FB 1.0 0.0012 1 0.0021 1 0.0012 1 0.4392 4 
CS1 0.0012 1 0.0340 5 0.0200 6 0.3032 1 
0.5 
CS2 
0.502 
0.0012 1 0.0051 2 0.0020 3 0.3300 2 
PG 7.0 0.0076 5 0.0456 4 0.0060 1 0.6780 6 
PG 7.2 0.0152 6 0.0492 5 0.0108 5 0.5256 5 
IB 6.0 0.0060 1 0.0384 3 0.0076 3 0.4704 3 
FB 1.0 0.0060 1 0.0076 1 0.0060 1 0.4756 4 
CS1 0.0060 1 0.0492 5 0.0324 6 0.3376 1 
0.99 
CS2 
0.992 
0.0060 1 0.0124 2 0.0076 3 0.3652 2 
5.2 Study with the Known Bugs of the Servers 
Now we compare the servers using the methodology described in section 4.3. We have collected known bug 
reports for four SQL servers. We will use the union of the bugs reported for each of these SQL servers. Each of 
these bug reports will constitute a ‘demand’ to the server. These demands form a partition of the demand space 
for each server9. In contrast to the TPC-C study where partitioning of the demand space was not used, in the 
study with the bug reports we apply inferences to the partitions. The reason for doing so was the very different 
prior beliefs about the behaviour of servers in the different partitions as will be discussed in section 5.2.1. The 
logs of the known bugs are treated as a sample (without replacement10) from the corresponding partition 
(representing the server, for which the bug has been reported). We label the partitions nameServerS . Partition 
XS  is called an ‘own’ partition for server X and a ‘foreign’ partition for any other server Y≠X.  
                                                           
9 We have observed no bug reported for two or more servers, thus the logs of the known bugs indeed formed partitions of the 
union of the bugs. Even if we had observed bugs reported from more than one server we could construct a partition of the 
intersection of the bugs reported for several servers by putting them in their own partition. Thus, a server may have more 
than one own partition in the demand space and the description provided here will apply.  
10 Strictly, there might be a difference between sampling with and without replacement. Our model is based on sampling 
without replacement while the inference procedure described in section 4.1 implies sampling with replacement. This is a 
simplification, which in many cases is acceptable (e.g. sampling from a large population of units, none of which dominates 
the sampling process, which seems a plausible assumption in our case of SQL servers being very complex products and 
likely to contain many unknown bugs). 
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5.2.1 Prior Distributions 
The prior distributions )|,,(,, ippp Sf ILLI •••  
used in this study are explained next. The prior 
distribution, )|,,(,, ippp Sf ILLI ••• , was constructed under similar assumptions to those of the TPC-C study: that  
PI and PL are independently distributed random variables; in the general case of incorrect and late responses 
being non-independent events, the conditional distributions, ),,|(,| LIiPPp PPSf LIIL • , are specified for every pair 
of values of PI and PL. 
The distributions were assumed to be identical for each of the four servers in both their ‘own’ and ‘foreign’ 
partitions. Again, this assumption was made because we did not have objective evidence to believe otherwise. 
We discuss other options in section 6.4. A summary of the distributions used and their respective parameters 
including the range of each distribution are given in Table 5, and we will discuss these choices in the rest of this 
sub-section.  
Table 5 – The Prior distributions (identical for all four severs). 
 Proportion Range Distribution 
)|( ownp Sf I •  0.72 – 1  Uniform 
Reliability 
)|( foreignp Sf I •  0 – 1 Uniform 
)|( ownp Sf L •  0 – 1 Uniform 
Performance 
)|( foreignp Sf L •  0 – 1  Uniform 
Conditional distribution: ),,|(,| LIppp PPSf LIIL •  0 – min(PI,PL) Uniform 
 
Prior distributions for Incorrect Results )|( ip Sf I •  
For ‘own’ partitions the prior distribution was defined as Uniform in the range [L, 1], where L < 1 accounts for 
the chance that some of the reported bugs might be Heisenbugs11, i.e. we expect most of the bugs that have been 
reported for a particular server to cause failures when they are run on that server (hence the probability of 
observing an incorrect results failure is very close to 1) but, due to Heisenbugs, not always so. As a source for L 
we used the study by Chandra and Chen [41]. These authors studied the fault reports for three off-the-shelf 
components: MySQL database server, GNOME desktop environment and the Apache web-server and reported 
that 5%, 7% and 14%, respectively, of the reported bugs were Heisenbugs. Given the variation between the 
components we cautiously interpreted these findings by setting L = 1-(2*0.14), that is twice the highest value of 
Heisenbugs reported, thus the prior is expected to be within the range [0.72, 1]. Notice that here the prior 
distribution for incorrect results is being defined at a range close to 1 (i.e. high unreliability). This is because of 
the unusual profile of the demands: since we are using known bug reports as demands we expect most of the 
bugs to cause failures when we run them on the server for which they were reported. 
For ‘foreign’ partitions, however, the prior distributions were defined as uniform in the range [0, 1]. This is due 
to the absence of any comparative study to guide our expectation about the likely value. In passing we note that 
                                                           
11 Gray defines two types of bugs [40]: “Bohrbugs” for bugs that appear to be deterministic (they manifest themselves each 
time the bug script is executed); and “Heisenbugs” for those that are difficult to reproduce as they only cause failures under 
special conditions (e.g., created by the internal state affected by the other applications etc.) 
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theoretical work such as [42], [43] suggest that diverse software versions will tend to fail coincidentally on 
‘difficult’ demands. Since all the bugs are ‘difficult’ – they are known to be problematic at least for one of the 
servers – we may consider them genuinely difficult, hence assume as plausible that the other servers too, are 
likely to fail. On the other hand, empirical studies such as [44], [45], have shown that significant gains can be 
had via design diversity – hence low chances that a particular server will fail on bugs reported for other server 
are also plausible. In summary, we are indifferent between the values of the probability that a server will fail 
from a ‘foreign’ bug.  
Prior Distributions for Performance  )|( ip Sf L •  
We have not found a public domain source, which would allow us to define a prior distribution for performance 
failures (in the context we have defined). This is also because the number of late results that would be observed 
would be conditional on how the timeout threshold is set. The only remaining source is to look at the data (either 
our own or of various vendors) from the experiments using the TPC-C [38] benchmark. However it is not clear 
how reasonable a prior based on these results would be due to the differences in the profile that will exist 
between the TPC-C client application and the bug scripts. Therefore we have decided to define the prior 
distribution for all proportions as uniformly distributed in the range 0 to 1, i.e. be ‘indifferent’ between the 
possible chances of the servers exceeding the set timeout.  
Prior Distributions for Incorrect and Late Results  ),,|(,| LIiPPp PPSf LIIL •  
All conditional prior distributions of the probability of a result being at the same time incorrect and late were 
defined in the range [0, min(PI,PL)] (since the probability of incorrect and late responses cannot be greater than 
the probability of either of the two individually). This is again due to the rather unique profile, under which we 
apply the inference and the lack of comparable studies that would enable us to define different priors than 
assuming ‘indifference’. 
Priors for Probabilities of a Bug Being Selected From the Partitions 
For the comparison of the servers we use a distribution defined on the set of partitions, which does not favour 
any of the servers, i.e. we assumed that probability of each partition is 0.25 in the study with 4 servers12.  
5.2.3 Observations 
The observations using the known bugs of four off-the-shelf servers are given in Table 6. We can see that the 
number of bugs collected for each server was different, which indicated that the empirical evidence differs 
between the partitions. The reasons for this was merely differences in the reporting practices operated by the 
vendors of the servers, e.g. unavailability in the public domain of fully reproducible bug scripts for the 
commercial servers (especially CS1). Therefore, the sizes of the samples from the partitions on each server are 
different. Additionally, these servers are not functionally identical: they offer different degrees of compliance 
with the SQL standard(s) and even proprietary extension to SQL. Bugs affecting one of these extensions, 
therefore, cannot exist in a server that lacks the extension. In other words, such bug scripts will provide empirical 
evidence for the server they were reported for but not for the other servers. We called these “dialect-specific” 
                                                           
12 We could have used the number of known bugs for each of the partition to construct a profile consistent with the 
observations. This is not acceptable for two reasons: i) it will favour poor bug reporting practices, and ii) we would have 
used the bugs twice – once in the inference procedure and another time for the profile, which is theoretically unsound. 
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bugs. Due to this, not all the bugs reported for a server can be run on the other servers. Therefore the number of 
‘foreign’ bug reports varies between the servers. The interested reader will find an extensive discussion of the 
study with the bugs in [37]. 
Table 6 – The observations for the 4 off-the-shelf servers on the bug reports of the different partitions. In the partition 
column we have stated for which server these bugs have been reported.   
COTS Partition 
Number of 
demands n 
r1 r2 r3 
0.7PGS  57 41 0 11 
0.6IBS  28 1 0 0 
1CSS  4 1 0 0 
PG 7.0 
2CSS  18 6 0 0 
0.7PGS  24 0 0 0 
0.6IBS  55 37 3 7 
1CSS  4 0 0 0 
IB 6.0 
2CSS  12 1 0 0 
0.7PGS  30 0 0 0 
0.6IBS  31 0 0 0 
1CSS  18 10 1 3 
CS1 
2CSS  12 0 0 0 
0.7PGS  33 2 0 0 
0.6IBS  35 2 0 0 
1CSS  4 0 0 0 
CS2 
2CSS  51 28 6 5 
5.2.4 The Posterior Results 
The 50th and 99th percentiles of the marginal distribution, )(•w
Serp
f 13, associated with each server is shown in 
Table 7. Since the prior distributions are identical for each of the components, then the ordering of the 
components in the posteriors will be determined by the observations. The best server, across all the percentiles is 
CS1. This is not surprising since CS1 did not fail for any of the foreign bugs. The second best server is CS2, 
although IB 6.0 is very close, both at the 50% and the 99% level of confidence. This is somewhat surprising at 
first given that this server failed more on the foreign bugs than IB6.0. However, the total number of foreign bugs 
that could be run on CS2 (72) is much higher than IB6.0 (40). Additionally the number of Heisenbugs for CS2 is 
also much higher (23.5%) than IB6.0 (14.5%), which leads to the CS2 being better in the posteriors.  
Table 7 - The table shows the percentiles of the system quality )(•w
Serp
f for each server. 
Percentiles 0.5 0.99 
COTS PG7.0 IB6.0 CS1 CS2 PG7.0 IB6.0 CS1 CS2 
Priors  0.77 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 
Posterior 0.42 0.32 0.24 0.3 0.55 0.45 0.32 0.42 
                                                           
13 We omitted the detailed results related to the individual partitions due to a lack of space. 
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5.3. Discussion of the Results for the Two Setups 
We have seen that under the more ‘stressful’ profiles (i.e. Scenario 4 in the TPC-C study and the Bugs study) the 
best COTS component is CS1. The fact that we have come to the same conclusion using rather different testing 
methods and different profiles would give us an extra assurance that CS1 is indeed the best component for 
applications with more stringent reliability and performance requirements which operate at greater transaction 
load and level of concurrency. However if the concurrency is low, then even with more rigid performance 
requirements (Scenario 2) Firebird 1.0 server, which is open-source and freely available, comes out as the best 
server. 
The two studies are also in agreement with respect to the worst server – these are the PostgreSQL components.  
We could also use the outcome of the studies as a validation of the proposed method. CS1, which came out best, 
is widely accepted by the database community to be the best SQL server and has by far the largest share in the 
market of SQL servers. This gives some confidence that both the data that we used is sufficiently informative to 
allow for meaningful and accurate discrimination between the competing components and the method itself is 
trustworthy to provide rigorous ground for accurate COTS component selection. 
5.4. Further, Contrived Examples 
In the empirical study with the SQL servers we could not fully illustrate the interplay between the dependence 
and the uncertainty in the values of the attributes due to the empirical results often being strikingly different for 
each server and also because the prior distributions that we started with were the same for each server. In this 
section we provide some further numerical examples, which illustrate the usefulness of handling uncertainty and 
dependence between the attribute values explicitly. We comment on the cases where the choice of the best 
COTS component would differ with conventional assessment methods which rely on point estimates of the 
attribute values and make assumptions of independence between the values of the attributes. We also discuss the 
effect of the priors on the selection, including different priors for each of the competing components. The choice 
of prior distributions and the observations serve illustrative purposes only. The prior, ),,(,, •••ILLI pppf , was 
constructed under the assumption that PI and PL are both Beta independently distributed random variables, 
),,( baBeta • , defined in the interval [0, 0.01]14, i.e. )()(),(, ••=•• LILI pppp fff . The conditional 
distributions, ),|(,| LIppp PPf LIIL • , for every pair of values of PI and PL are also assumed to be Beta 
distributions, ),,( baBeta • . Clearly they are defined in the range [0, min(PI, PL)]. Note that we do not provide 
any justification for the choice of the prior distributions used here, and neither for the interval on which the 
distribution is defined; the particular choice of the type of the prior is dictated by some convenience offered by 
Beta distribution in the examples given below. The assessor can choose any prior distribution and interval that 
best represents his/her prior beliefs. 
                                                           
14 In all numerical calculations we used the function BETADIST (x, alfa, beta, lowerbound, upperbound) implemented in 
many standard libraries, see for instance [46]. The last two parameters, lowerbound, upperbound ∈ [0, 1], define the 
domain (i.e. the range of x) of the distribution. 
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5.4.1 Same Priors 
In the first example we consider 3 different COTS components, referred to as C1, C2 and C3 respectively for 
which the prior information does not give any reasons to prefer one to another, i.e. we are indifferent between 
C1, C2 and C3. The prior distributions, therefore, for all three COTS components are identical. We assumed 
Beta distributions as described above, with parameters given as follows: 
- Beta (2, 10) defined on [0, 0.01] for pfd associated with incorrect results )(•
Ip
f ;  
- Beta (2, 10) defined on [0, 0.01] for pld associated with late results )(•
Lp
f ;  
- Beta (3, 3) for the conditional distribution ),|(,| LIppp PPf LIIL • .  
This completes the definition of the tri-variate distribution, ),,(,, •••ILLI pppf .   
The assumed observations for these three COTS components are given in Table 8.  
For Observation 1 the total number of incorrect or late results are the same for C2 and C3: 5 each. But the failure 
correlations differ in the two components: for C2 these failures happen on 5 demands (i.e. each of these 5 
demands gives both an incorrect and a late response), whereas for C3 they happen on 10 demands (the responses 
are either incorrect or late). For Observation 2 both the total number of failures and the failure correlation are 
different in the three COTS components.  
Table 8 - Observations from testing the COTS components. All observations are from test campaigns of 5000 demands. The 
observations differ by the number of incorrect (r1+ r3) and late (r2+ r3) responses and the number of incorrect & late (r3) 
responses.  
Observation ID Number of demands, n COTS r1+r3 r2+r3 r3 
C1 0 0 0 
C2 5 5 5 Observation 1 5000 
C3 5 5 0 
C1 20 10 10 
C2 13 13 10 Observation 2 5000 
C3 10 10 0 
Table 9 shows the results using the percentiles of the prior/posterior distributions of the probability of an 
inadequate response PSer. The posterior distribution for Observation 1 reveals that C1 is clearly the best 
component, since testing revealed no failures for this component. The interesting results are for C2 and C3. Even 
though the total number of failures observed for C2 and C3 is the same we can still distinguish between them 
since the types of failures observed in both cases differ. Positive correlation between the two types of failures is 
observed for C2 whereas the correlation observed between the types of failure for C3 is negative. As a result, the 
posterior distribution of C2 after testing with Observation 1 is better than that of C3 for all percentiles. Using 
conventional methods of assessment, where the attributes are assessed independently, this distinction would 
have not been possible since the marginal distributions for the two attributes are the same in both C2 and C3 
leading to identical results for these two components. We commented on a similar observation for IB 6.0 and 
CS2 servers in section 5.1.3. 
The posterior after the Observation 2 is also interesting. The total number of failures observed in C3 is the lowest 
(20 in total) in comparison with C2 (26) and C3 (30). However the correlation between the two types of failures 
is very different. In C3 there is a maximum negative correlation between the two types of failure (the observed 
failures are either incorrect or late responses but not both). For C2 we see 10 incorrect results which are also late. 
And for C1 we see that all late results are also incorrect. Thus, the observations indicate different degrees of 
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correlation between the two types of failure, which as a result, translates into quite different posteriors for the 
three COTS components. We would choose C2 as the best COTS component despite the total number of failures 
(26) observed during testing for this component being higher than the total for C3 (20). This example clearly 
indicates that the ‘uncertainty explicit’ assessment method proposed in this paper and conventional assessment 
methods15 would have concluded differently regarding which of C2 and C3 should be chosen. The reason for this 
difference is the correlation between the two types of failure, which we take into account while the conventional 
methods, which are based on separate assessment of the attributes, would ignore. 
Table 9 - The table shows the percentiles of the chosen parameters of system quality. 
Percentiles 0.5 0.99 
COTS C1 C2 C3 C1 C2 C3 
System Quality PSer = PI + PL – PIL 
Priors  0.0025 0.0025 0.0025 0.0061 0.0061 0.0061 
Observation 1 0.0005 0.0011 0.002 0.0015 0.0024 0.0037 
Observation 2 0.0033 0.0027 0.0036 0.0051 0.0044 0.0056 
5.4.2 Different Priors, Same Observations 
In the second example we will consider 2 different COTS components, COTS 1 and COTS 2 referred to as C1, 
and C2. The assumed testing results for C1 and C2 are identical. The prior distributions, however, for the two 
COTS components are now different. We will define Beta distributions again but with different parameters for 
each COTS component, as given in Table 10. The ranges on which the marginal distributions are defined remain 
the same as in section 5.4.1 
Table 10 - The parameters (a, b) for the Beta prior distributions defined for each COTS components. 
COTS 
Reliability  
)(•
Ip
f  
Performance  
)(•
Lp
f  
Conditional distribution: 
),|(,| LIppp PPf LIIL •  
C1 (5,5) (5,5) (3,3) 
C2 (15,14) (15,14) (9,9) 
 
A high value for parameter a of the Beta distribution means that the distribution is shifted to the right – in our 
context it represents a prior belief that the number of failures will be high, whereas the b parameter shifts the 
distribution to the left (i.e. a prior belief that the number of failures will be low). The higher the values are, the 
smaller the uncertainty. We can see for example that C1 and C2 are going to have very similar mean values (the 
mean of the Beta distribution being a / (a + b)) but the prior distribution for C2 is being expressed with much 
greater certainty. Therefore the prior distribution of C2 will be much less ‘spread’ from that of C1 as is 
illustrated in Fig. 2.   
                                                           
15 The conventional methods not exploring the dependence in the values of the attributes would conclude that C3 is better 
than C2. 
Uncertainty Explicit Assessment of Off-The-Shelf Software: A Bayesian Approach      22 
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
1.1
0 0.002 0.004 0.006 0.008 0.01 0.012 0.014
Pser
c
.d
.f
.
COTS 2
COTS 4
 
Fig. 2 - The prior distribution for the probability of an inadequate response (PSer) for C1 and C2. We can see that the prior 
distribution for C1 is more ‘spread’ than that of C2 which reflects the assessor’s higher uncertainty in the prior beliefs for the 
values of C1. 
We do not make any claims that the priors used in the examples should be used in practical assessment. They 
serve illustrative purposes only and yet, have been chosen from a reasonable range. For example, the mean of PI 
for C1 is 5*10
-3
, which is a value from a typical range for many software components. 
One set of observations were used for the calculations with the number of trials, N = 5000 as shown in Table 11. 
Table 11 - Observation 3 from testing the COTS components. 
Observation ID Number of tests, N COTS r1+r3 r2+r3 r3 
Observation 3 5000 All 4 4 1 
 
Table 12 shows the results using the percentiles of the prior/posterior distributions of the probability of an 
inadequate response PSer. The structure of the table is similar to that of Table 9. 
Interesting points with reference to these posterior values are: 
- At the 50
th
 percentile, if the selection is based on the prior values then C1 is the best component. However at 
the 99th percentile16 then the ordering changes: C2 is now the preferred choice over the two. For those 
assessors who prefer to minimize the risk of making ‘wrong’ decisions with high confidence (i.e. 90%+), C2 
is the better choice. This type of distinction would have not been possible in the conventional methods of 
COTS component assessment, which use point values rather than distributions. 
- The posterior values of C2 have shifted significantly in comparison with the priors but not as much as those 
of C1, even though the testing results for these two components are the same. This is due to the prior 
distributions: for C1 the prior distribution was highly spread, signifying that the uncertainty was high prior to 
testing; the opposite is true for C2. Therefore the posterior distribution of C1 is influenced by the testing 
results much more than that of C2. 
Table 12 - The table shows the percentiles of the chosen parameters of system quality. 
Percentiles 0.5 0.99 
COTS C1 C2 C1 C2 
System Quality PSer = PI + PL – PIL 
Priors 0.0078 0.0079 0.0122 0.0106 
Observation 3 0.0028 0.0046 0.0048 0.0065 
                                                           
16 The same ordering was observed for all percentiles higher than 90th. 
C1 
2 
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 6 Discussion of Applicability of the Proposed Assessment Method 
6.1 Many Assessment Attributes 
We have illustrated in the previous sections how the assessment can be done for the reliability and performance 
attributes, which are usually the most important attributes for software COTS components compliant with a 
known specification (e.g. SQL servers, J2EE Application servers, Business Process Execution Engines [47] etc.). 
For such software components (products) we consider repeating the measurements described in section 5 are 
feasible. We illustrated that, even for assessments in which only two attributes are considered, taking account of 
the dependence that exists between these attributes can lead to a different decision on which COTS component to 
choose compared with the methods that do not account for this dependence. 
It is a common practice that COTS components are assessed in terms of more than 2 attributes, usually many 
more. Among attributes that are suitable for quantitative measurement are: 
- “Recoverability” (which again can be characterised in terms of correctness of the recovery and the timeliness 
of the recovery) [48]. 
- “Usability” (which can also be characterised in terms of the correctness with which a user performs an action 
with a given system, and timeliness of their actions). This kind of objective characterisation of usability may 
be especially important in socio-technical applications, especially those which are safety-critical, such as Air 
Traffic Control, in which the controllers’ accuracy and timeliness of their actions are important.  
The obvious question, therefore, is whether the proposed ‘uncertainty explicit’ assessment ‘scales up’ to many 
attributes. Formally, the question is how the method applies if we have to compare COTS components, each of 
which is represented by a multivariate distribution ( )np aaaf ,...,, 21 . The assessment will deliver posterior 
distributions ( )assessmentaaaf np |,...,, 21 , which will be used in the comparison. A new variable should be 
defined as a function of the variates of the distribution {a1, a2, …, an}, e.g. a weighted sum of all the attributes. 
The uncertainty associated with this aggregate variable is easily derived from the joint 
posterior ( )assessmentaaaf np |,...,, 21 . Even though mathematically possible, Bayesian inference with 
multivariate distributions is difficult. The difficulty has two aspects: 
- Specifying a multivariate prior distribution becomes very difficult because many non-intuitive dependencies 
between the attributes must be defined and justified. 
- Manipulating a multivariate distribution is non-trivial even using the most advanced math/statistical tools. 
Calculating the posterior distribution is impracticable with more than 3 variates and without simplifying 
assumptions about the dependencies between them. 
To partially overcome these difficulties a divide-and-conquer approach can be employed. First the attributes can 
be grouped into smaller groups so that there are dependencies within the groups, which the assessment can 
capture, but the groups are assumed independent. In other words, knowing the values of the attributes in one 
group does not change the assessor’s knowledge (belief) about the values of the attributes included in the other 
group. Assume that our initial multivariate distribution can be represented as two independent groups of 
attributes: 
- ( ) =nppp aaaf n ,...,, 21,..., 21  
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( ) ( )nsspppsppp aaafaaaf nssss ,...,,,...,, 21,...,21,..., 2121 +++++×  
- the likelihood of observing the COTS component in operation can be expressed as: 
( )( )=nppp aaafnobservatioL n ,...,,| 21..., 21 ( )( )×sppp aaafnobservatioL s ,...,,| 21...,1 21
 ( )( )nssppp aaafnobservatioL nsss ,...,,| 21,...,2 21 +++++  
In this case, it trivially follows that: 
( ) =assessmentaaaf nppp n |,...,, 21,..., 21  
( )×assessmentaaaf sppp s |,...,, 21,..., 21 ( )assessmentaaaf nSsppp nsss |,...,, 21,..., 21 +++++  
We have so far defined three groups of attributes with which assessment can be performed 
(Reliability/Performance, Recoverability and Usability). Other groups of attributes may also exist (even though 
our survey of COTS attribute definition papers (e.g. [16], [20]) found very few attributes that lend themselves to 
objective assessment).  We should note, however, that there are dependencies even amongst the groups identified 
(for example, we may observe that incorrect results and incorrect recovery actions are highly correlated). 
Assuming that these belong to independent groups will prevent us from learning about these dependences. 
Despite this potential deficiency, however, there is clearly an improvement over the existing methods, in which 
every single attribute is treated independently. 
6.2 Decisions on How to Perform the Assessment 
We outlined the problems with assessment of a large number of attributes due to the complex set of 
dependencies that may exist between the different attributes. The higher the number of attributes to be assessed 
and the higher the number of independence assumptions that are made the more difficult it becomes to place a 
high degree of confidence in the results obtained from the assessment. The limitations we have outlined in 
section 6.1, however, are not specific to our assessment method; in fact they are more serious for the 
conventional methods in which the individual attributes are assessed separately. We illustrated with numerical 
examples in section 5.4 that even when the assessment is done using two attributes, ignoring the dependence 
between the values of the attributes may lead to wrong decisions: a sub-optimal component may wrongfully be 
chosen as the best one. If this could be observed with only two attributes, then it is bound to be much more 
pronounced with more than two attributes, where many more dependencies may exist between the values of the 
attributes.   
Doing the assessment with ‘independent groups’ of attributes also has its problems. It can only be applied if the 
assessor can justify that assuming a set of independent pairs is plausible. Despite this problem, however, using 
small independent groups is still an improvement compared with the extreme assumption used implicitly in the 
existing assessment methods surveyed, that all of the attributes are independent.  
It is worth pointing out that many of the attributes, such as ‘has the required functions’, various forms of 
compliance, e.g. ‘complies with certain standards’, “backward compatibility”, etc. [16], do not require any 
uncertainty attached to their values. Assessment with respect to such attributes normally leads to a reduction of 
the number of the COTS components (which satisfy all these ‘binary’ attributes), for which the more thorough 
assessment with respect to the remaining ‘non-binary’ attributes needs to be done [49]. 
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6.3 The Types of COTS Components for Which the Assessment Method Can be Applied 
The method of assessment proposed in this paper would be applicable to any family of COTS components. The 
setup described in section 4 and illustrated in section 5 is particularly relevant for COTS components with 
stringent reliability and performance requirements. In section 5 we provided empirical results using off-the-shelf 
database servers. There is a plethora of off-the-shelf database servers, both open source and commercial. 
Deciding which one to choose among the many choices available overwhelmingly depends on the reliability of 
servers and their performance.   
Java Virtual Machines (JVMs), various Application Servers, Web Servers and Business Process Execution 
Engines [47] are also examples of COTS components where reliability and performance requirements are 
usually the deciding attributes for selection. Fault and failure reports, which can be used as observations, do exist 
for these products and so do performance benchmarks (e.g. ab benchmarking tool for web servers [50]). 
Therefore, similar measurements to what we did for database servers are also possible with these other families 
of COTS components. In many cases for these components one may not need to deal with more than 2 attributes, 
which makes our 2-attribute model proposed in section 4 immediately applicable without any further 
simplifications. 
6.4 Other Ways of Eliciting the Prior Distributions 
The prior definition in Bayesian assessment is crucial. In our studies we have assumed that prior distributions for 
each component are the same. This was due to the unavailability of other known ‘objective’ evidence that we 
could use to define more reasonable priors. Anecdotal evidence about the servers does exist, but is difficult to 
translate these subjective beliefs into priors in the form required by our method. By assuming that the prior 
distributions were the same for each server, the decision on which server is chosen is dictated by the 
observations only. As a result the decision of the types of distributions for the random variables in our study 
becomes less important.  
However there are other ways of deriving more reasonable priors. We could, for example, utilize evidence from 
earlier versions of the servers and then do multiple steps of inference, i.e. if we want to perform the assessment 
with later versions of the servers in our study (e.g. with versions of PostgreSQL after release 7.2 or Firebird after 
release 1.0) we can use the posteriors derived here as priors for the later versions, collect the new evidence for 
the later versions and then use the model to derive the posteriors for each. This approach has also been reported 
elsewhere [21]. 
7. Conclusion 
To handle the inherent uncertainty in the COTS component assessment we propose the use of “uncertainty 
explicit” methods. As a Bayesian approach to representing uncertainty has been successfully applied in other 
contexts of assessment we have defined a Bayesian model that can be used for assessment of COTS components 
with respect to two related attributes. This approach complements the conventional selection procedures with 
more powerful calculus, which can take into account the uncertainty explicitly.  
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We have conducted an empirical study with off-the-shelf database servers which also illustrated the use of the 
method. The contribution of this paper is in several aspects: 
- We have demonstrated in the context of the COTS component assessment how to apply the Bayesian 
methods which have had some popularity in reliability assessment of both software and hardware.  
- We have described the use of the model in selecting the best off-the-shelf database server from a sample of 
different servers, using two sources of data:  
- Experiments using an implementation of TPC-C benchmark for database severs. 
- Known faults reported for four different servers. 
- We recommend that the ‘uncertainty explicit’ assessment methods be considered at least as a non-expensive 
warranty against badly sub-optimal decisions possible with the conventional COTS component selection 
methods (we provided contrived numerical examples which show examples of sub-optimal selections of 
COTS components if uncertainty or dependence in the values of the attributes are ignored). 
- We have also demonstrated how our model can be extended and used with a partitioned demand space which 
allows utilization in the inference of all the evidence available from the different partitions. 
An interesting observation from the study with SQL servers is that the results of the inference with the more 
stressful setups (Scenario 4 of the TPC-C study and the bugs study) both lead to CS1 being preferred as the best 
server and PG servers being the worst. This may give the assessor further assurance of preferring CS1 for an 
application with more stringent reliability, performance and concurrency requirements given that it performed 
best under two very different but ‘stressful’ profiles. Interestingly, CS1 is considered by the DB community as a 
leader among the SQL servers vendors, which may be seen as validation of the method’s usefulness for making a 
correct choice among several similar COTS components despite the scarcity of the data that we could use. 
There are several well-known difficulties of using Bayesian assessment - it does not scale up well due to: 
- The difficulty with specifying a multivariate prior distribution when the number of attributes to be assessed 
increases, unless independence is assumed among the attributes. Defining the prior is crucial. It may be 
difficult for practitioners, not comfortable with non-trivial math, to express their individual beliefs as 
probability distributions.  
- The difficulty with manipulating a multivariate distribution, which becomes impracticable with more than 3 
variates if no simplifying assumptions are made.  
Future work that is desirable includes: 
- Methods are needed which would allow for effective assessment with a large number of related attributes. 
Currently the ‘uncertainty explicit’ assessment only works with a limited number of related attributes (or 
with independent groups of attributes in which the number of attributes in the groups is small). 
- Further development of the theoretical framework is needed for cases of groups of more than 2 dependent 
attributes. Conceptually, the multivariate inference is no different than the 1- and 2-variate inferences. Its 
practical use, however, is currently problematic. 
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